In the past few days, the European Commission has urged member states to block high-risk equipment suppliers from their 5G networks as soon as possible. Huawei and ZTE, in particular, have been identified as posing a “materially higher” risk. According to the European Union’s progress report on 5G cybersecurity, almost all member countries, with the exception of three, have already passed or are in the process of passing laws to enforce these restrictions.
While the report does not disclose the three member states deliberately, the Commission’s recommendation to limit these suppliers is subject to assessments made by national authorities of member states. During a speech accompanying the report, Thierry Breton, the European commissioner for the internal market, expressed concern over the slow progress made by member states. He emphasized that only 10 out of 24 states developing the capacity to exclude high-risk vendors have taken action so far, which poses significant security risks and vulnerabilities for the EU and its critical infrastructure.
Beijing has accused the West of unjustly alleging security risks associated with Chinese equipment, suggesting that the restrictions are, in fact, protectionist measures. Huawei, whose equipment has been closely examined by the British cyber intelligence agency GCHQ since 2010, maintains that no “backdoors” have been found. However, software engineering and cybersecurity flaws have been identified, although GCHQ clarified that these defects were not the result of Chinese state interference, and there is no evidence that the vulnerabilities were exploited.
In addition to the security concerns, both Huawei and ZTE face sanctions from the United States, preventing them from accessing American technology and software for their product development. This situation further complicates the oversight of their products by GCHQ, making it significantly more challenging.
Bart Groothuis, the cyber rapporteur for the European Parliament, emphasized that the issue with Huawei and ZTE lies not in secret backdoors but rather in the companies’ ties to the Chinese state. Western apprehensions regarding the risks associated with Chinese equipment vendors stem from concerns over Beijing’s cyber espionage activities and China’s National Intelligence Law, which grants extensive powers to the state. Groothuis noted that 5G networks are crucial for the state’s political, strategic, and military aspects, making it imperative to avoid relying on adversaries in such critical networks.
Given the EU’s previous success in reducing dependencies in sectors like energy, Commissioner Breton called for decisive action without delay. He warned that maintaining critical dependencies in 5G networks could become a potential weapon against the EU’s interests and pose significant risks to common security. He urged all EU member states and telecom operators to take necessary measures promptly.
Cyber Journal 